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CORPORATIONS
Alan W. Tompkins*
Theodore S. O'Neal**

LTHOUGH the Texas Legislature was not in session during the
Survey period' a few interesting corporation law cases were decided by Texas courts. The first, Docudata Records Management
Services, Inc. v. Wieser,2 deals with a strained interpretation of a corporate restructuring transaction. The remaining three cases all involve
plaintiffs who were successful in piercing the corporate veil, at least at the
trial court level.
It is often said that bad facts make bad law, but rarely has the truth of
that adage been more evident than in Docudata Records Management
Services, Inc. v. Wieser.3 Keith Wieser was knowledgeable in the medical
records retrieval business. He approached Moen and Hoff, the two
shareholders of LRS Group, Inc. (LRS), about going into the business.
Moen and Hoff agreed and caused LRS to create a new corporate subsidiary (Docudata) through which the business would be conducted. The
parties agreed that the objective would be to develop Docudata's business to a point where it could be sold or taken public. Wieser was concerned that, eventually, he might not be rewarded for his contribution to
the new business, so Moen and Hoff caused Docudata to enter into an
agreement with Wieser whereby he would get a portion of the sale price
"should [Docudata] be sold."' 4 This contract was the basis for the case.
Over the next several years, the business flourished. Moen and Hoff
continued to develop the holdings of LRS and entered into negotiations
with a venture capital firm regarding additional capital. Through those
negotiations, Moen and Hoff entered into a share exchange agreement
with another company engaged in the records business. The agreement
provided that Moen and Hoff would contribute their shares in LRS, the
parent corporation of Docudata, to a newly-formed holding corporation
(Comdoc) in exchange for fewer than twenty percent of the new corporation's shares. The other company would contribute the stock of one of its
corporations in exchange for the remainder of the new corporation's
* M.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University; Certified Public Accountant, Texas;
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shares. The agreement also required that Docudata be merged into LRS
within 90 days after the date of the agreement. 5 The transactions contemplated by the agreement were consummated as expected during the summer of 1993, and the companies began restructuring their operations to
6
take advantage of the new situation.
Wieser reasonably thought that the share exchange and merger transaction constituted a sale of Docudata that would entitle him to compensation, so he approached Moen and Hoff. 7 They denied that he was
entitled to a bonus based on the transaction. Shortly thereafter, Wieser
quit the company and went to work for a competitor. Within two weeks
LRS and Docudata sued Wieser for breaching his non-competition agreement.8 Wieser counterclaimed, alleging that LRS and Docudata had
failed to pay the compensation due him upon the sale of the company. 9
The trial court found that Wieser had not breached his non-competition
agreement but that LRS and Docudata had breached their obligation to
pay his compensation when due. The court awarded Wieser just over
$135,000 in damages. 10
Docudata appealed, and its first point of error was that the evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding
that Docudata was sold. 1' Wieser based his argument that Docudata had
been sold on the fact that the ultimate control of the corporation had
shifted from Moen and Hoff to a previously-affiliated corporation, and
that Docudata's legal existence had terminated upon the merger with
LRS. 12 He argued that any other interpretation would deny him the ben13
efit of his bargain.
The First Court of Appeals, however, took an extremely narrow view
of the Docudata disposition. The court relied on the fact that immediately following the exchange transaction, the shares of Docudata were
still owned by LRS-notwithstanding the obligation that the two corporations merge within 90 days. 14 The court somehow came to the conclusion that in order for Wieser's argument to succeed, the independent
corporate existence of LRS and Docudata would have to be disregarded. 15 The court was not willing to take that step, and further believed that Wieser's rights were such as to "restrict the free transfer of
stock" and should, therefore, be narrowly construed. 16 The court held
that the share exchange and merger was "simply a restructuring in the
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corporate form of the subsidiary's business" that did not rise to the level
of a sale. 1 7 The court reversed and rendered judgment that Wieser take
nothing,t8 proving once again that no good deed goes unpunished.
Menetti v. Chavers19 presented the San Antonio Court of Appeals with
an opportunity to apply the recently-amended language of TBCA article
2.21(A)(2), which protects a corporate shareholder from personal liability
for a corporate contractual obligation (or other matter arising from or
relating to that obligation) under the alter ego or similar theory unless an
actual fraud directly benefitting the shareholder is proven. 20 The facts
indicate that the Chavers signed a contract with Menetti & Co., Inc. for
the construction of an addition to their home. The construction work was
faulty, so the Chavers sued Menetti & Co., Inc. for breach of contract,
fraud, deceptive trade practices, and negligence, and also named shareholders Vincent and Felecia Menetti as individual defendants under the
alter ego theory.
The pretrial and trial proceedings in this case were quite poorly handled by the trial court, as evidenced by one error rising to the level of
abuse of discretion, 21 and resulted in a generally confusing situation. 22
The corporation's pleadings were stricken and a default judgment was
entered against the corporation because the entity had failed to obtain
legal counsel within a three-day period previously ordered by the court
(even though the entity had retained counsel several months before trial)
and because the corporation was not current on its franchise taxes on the
day of trial. 23 The corporation's counsel requested that the entity be permitted to defend itself if the taxes were paid by the next day, but the
request was denied. Therefore, the corporation was not allowed to present a defense at trial. The apparent confusion in the proceedings resulted
in the Menettis presenting a defense only as to damages. 24 The jury
found in favor of the Chavers and awarded them $137,000 (which the
judge later reduced to $97,000).25 Judgment was entered against the
Menettis individually, based on the Chavers' alter ego assertions. The
Menettis' motion for new trial was refused. 26
The Menettis filed an appeal on behalf of the corporation, but later
dismissed that appeal. Next, they appealed the judgment against themselves claiming, among other things, that the trial court erred in not allowing them to individually assert defenses to the plaintiff's causes of
action.27 The Chavers responded that the Menettis had no standing to
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bring claims as to the merits of the judgment against the corporation because they had filed their appeal as individuals. The court of appeals
properly reasoned that because there was no individual harm to the
Menettis without a piercing of the corporate veil of some sort, they were
not directly injured as a result of the default judgment against the corporation. 28 That reasoning disposed of2 9all claims that the trial court erred in
finding liability by the corporation.
The Menettis next claimed that they were not given an opportunity to
defend the alter ego allegations made by the Chavers, which was the only
basis for holding the Menettis personally liable for the corporation's obligations. 3o1 The court of appeals found that whether the Menettis were
allowed to defend was "unclear from the record,"' 3' but also concluded
that the Chavers had failed to introduce legally sufficient evidence to
pierce the Menetti & Co., Inc. corporate veil under the standard of
newly-amended TBCA article 2.21(A)(2). 32 As amended, that section
provides that no shareholder can be held personally liable for any contractual obligation of the corporation, or any matter relating to or arising
from the obligation, without a showing that the shareholder worked an
actual fraud on the obligee of the contract which accrued primarily to the
personal benefit of the shareholder. 33 The court of appeals recognized
that the claims made in this case related to or arose from a contractual
obligation of the corporation, were properly within the scope of TBCA
article 2.21(A)(2), and required a demonstration of actual fraud to pierce
the corporate veil. 34 The court also noted that a "finding that no actual
fraud was committed destroys not only the attempt to pierce the corporate veil by a showing of an alter ego, but by 'other similar theor[ies[." 35
After a detailed review of the record, the court of appeals found that
the Chavers had not presented sufficient evidence of actual fraud by the
Menettis. 36 This finding precluded holding the Menettis personally liable
for the obligations of their corporation, so the judgment against the
Menettis was reversed. 37 The default judgment against the corporation,
Menetti & Co., Inc., was unaffected.
Another alter ego case, Harwood Tire v. Young 38, arose from an onthe-job injury. Faron Young sued his employer, Harwood Arlington, Inc.
(HAI), along with its parent corporation, Harwood Tire, Inc. (HTI), alleging that HAI was HTI's alter ego. 39 About 30 days before the injury,
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HTI, which had been Young's employer, was reorganized such that it became a holding company for four subsidiary corporations. One of those
corporations, HAI, employed Young. A jury found that HAI was the
40
alter ego of HTI, and HTI and HAI appealed.
When Young began working for HTI, it owned three tire stores, one
each in Arlington, Bedford, and Irving. Young was the service manager
at the Arlington store. In June 1992, Frank Roszell, who owned all the
stock of HTI and was the sole director, created four subsidiary corporations-one to hold the assets of each store (including HAI) and one, Harwood CSF, Inc. (HCSF), which owned all real estate formerly held by
HTI. Roszell was the sole director of all the subsidiaries, which were all
wholly-owned by HTI, but his wife and others were officers of the subsidiaries. The rationale for this reorganization was that Roszell believed
HTI would grow and prosper under this format. Testimony indicated that
limiting liability was a minor factor in this decision to reorganize. 4 1
In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court noted that each
subsidiary had its own bylaws, articles of incorporation, and federal tax
identification number. "Corporate formalities were observed, and intercompany transfers were documented. ' 42 The court then looked at the
facts surrounding the inadequate capitalization theory, as well as the alter
ego theory, effectively intermingling the analysis. The court noted that as
part of the reorganization, HAT was allocated $154,000 in assets, along
with $98,000 in retained earnings. Roszell testified that HTI was more
capable of paying a judgment before the reorganization than after. 43 The
court also noted that Roszell had blanket authority to manage the subsidiaries after the reorganization, even though he was not an officer of the
subsidiaries. Nothing changed from a marketing perspective at the tire
stores, and Roszell's CPA continued to do work for HAI after the reorganization, which was paid for by HTI."
What the court focused on, however, was the fact that Roszell essentially bankrupted HAI through intercompany payments. In 1992, HAI
paid $50,000 of Roszell's $102,000 salary. Additionally, even though HAI
was characterized as barely breaking even at the end of 1993, it paid Roszell a $47,000 management fee shortly before it was closed in December
of 1993. 45 While the court noted that HAI owed no debts and closed with
$36,000 in assets, the court concluded that Roszell was using HAI as a
business conduit of HTI. For example, the HTI name was used synonymously throughout all the stores. HAI never signed a separate lease for
its store, nor did any assignment occur after the reorganization. Additionally, after HTI transferred all its real estate to HCSF, which consisted
of the Irving store location, HAI paid rent to HCSF even though it had
40. See id.
41. See id. at 885.
42. Id.

43. See Harwood Tire, 963 S.W.2d at 885-86.
44. See id. at 886.
45. See id.
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no real presence in that office. The payments were used to pay down the
46
Irving real estate but HAI got no ownership interest in the property.
Roszell could not explain why HAI would make payments for which it
received no benefit.
The court found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
findings disregarding the corporate fiction and finding HTI liable for the
injury to HAI's employee, Young. 4 7 The moral of the story is that while
the general corporate formalities were followed, the evidence certainly
suggested that Roszell treated the various companies as his personal bank
accounts, allowing the court to uphold the jury's determination.
Love v. State of Texas48 arose from an action by the State of Texas to
enforce a final order issued by the Railroad Commission assessing administrative penalties against Sopresa Petroleum, Inc. (Sopresa) for failure to
plug inactive wells. The State sought to show, and the jury found that,
Jeff Love (Love) and Daniel Welch (Welch) were individually liable for
Sopresa's debts as a result of piercing Sopresa's corporate veil.4 9 In affirming the trial court's findings, the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed
the undisputed facts and applicable law.
Sopresa was the registered operator of two Texas oil and gas leases, the
"Klein" and the "VIM." Until Sopresa was allegedly sold in 1986, Welch
and Love were the sole shareholders and directors. Welch's father acted
as a vice president of the company. Sopresa, as the operator of the Klein
and VIM, was statutorily liable for failing to properly plug the wells.50
From 1984 to 1986, several notifications were sent to, and received by,
Sopresa advising it of the violations. In late 1986, Welch and Love transferred another lease (the Ogden lease) from Sopresa to another company
they controlled, Calidad Petroleum (Calidad). That well was producing
oil and gas in marketable quantities, unlike the Klein and VIM. Just
three days after transferring the Ogden lease to Calidad, Love and Welch
allegedly sold Sopresa to Luis Ybarra, a Mexican citizen. 51 Ybarra supposedly paid $1,000 for Sopresa, which included the two leases and some
equipment allegedly left at the sites to cover the cost of plugging the
wells. The Railroad Commission implied that Ybarra never existed, and
photos revealed that there was no equipment at the sites. 52
A few months after the alleged sale to Ybarra, the Railroad Commission received a letter from Love indicating that he and Welch no longer
controlled Sopresa, that Welch's father had resigned, and that Love was
no longer the registered agent. No one was able to locate Ybarra at the
Arizona address supplied by Love. The Railroad Commission issued final orders assessing administrative penalties against Sopresa in 1988 and
46.
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52.
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1993, and the wells were plugged by the State. The State then sued
53
Sopresa, Love, and Welch, and won.
The State had successfully alleged that Sopresa was the alter ego of
Love and Welch, and that Sopresa had been used by them as a sham. The
court of appeals held that the jury's finding that Welch and Love used
Sopresa as a sham did not conflict with a finding that Welch and Love
were not shareholders, directors, or officers. 54 The court noted that Texas
law does not require an individual to be a shareholder at the time liability
is assessed if the corporation is a sham used to perpetrate a fraud. 55 The
corporation will often have been dissolved, declared bankrupt, or sold by
the time the case is tried and liability assessed. Love and Welch could not
escape liability because they were no longer in their positions when the
56
wells were plugged or the final orders entered.
Love and Welch also argued that a finding of actual fraud was required
to support the sham theory under TBCA article 2.21. The court stated,
however, that the standard of actual fraud only applies to contractual obligations.5 7 In this case, the State sought to recover for violations of rules
relating to pollution and plugging expenses. Texas courts have recognized that such debts are fundamentally different from contractual obligations. 58 Therefore, the court held that the penalties, costs, and fees levied
against Welch and Love were not contractual and that no showing of actual fraud was required to uphold the finding that they used Sopresa as a
sham.
Finally, the court turned to the issue of whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the "sham" finding. Reciting the long-standing rule,
the court stated that the corporate fiction will be disregarded to prevent
the use of the corporate entity as a cloak for fraud, illegality, or to work
injustice. 59 The court noted that the transfer of the Ogden lease shortly
after the notices of violations (and just days before the allegedly fraudulent sale) clearly supported the sham theory, and the fact that no one was
able to locate Ybarra added further support. Hence, the court found sufficient evidence for the jury to have concluded that Love and Welch
manipulated Sopresa's corporate form to escape their statutory obliga53. See Love, 972 S.W.2d at 116.
54. See id. at 117. The court further stated that it need not reach the question of
whether the alter ego theory conflicted with the jury's other findings because it upheld the
jury's findings on the distinct "sham" theory. See id. at 117 n.2. While the court did not
directly address the issue, a question may be raised as to whether one must be a shareholder, director, or officer to be found to be the alter ego of a corporation. This should
serve as a wake-up call to lawyers seeking to pierce the corporate veil-if the facts support
and require it, alternative pleading of alter ego and "sham" theories may keep their client
in court and avoid this question.
55. See id. at 117 (citing Huff v. Harrell, 941 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1996, writ denied)).
56. See Love, 972 S.W.2d at 117.
57. See id. at 118.
58. See Serna v. State, 877 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
59. See Love, 972 S.W.2d at 119 (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 273
(Tex. 1986)).
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tions and acted against public policy, making it necessary to pierce the
60
corporate veil to prevent injustice.

60. See Love, 972 S.W.2d at 120. The court also cited numerous cases with similar
facts; Klein v. Sporting Goods, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist] 1989, writ denied)(sole shareholder liable for company debts when he incorporated
new business to continue business of foreclosed company); Speed v. Eluma Int'l, Inc. 757
S.W.2d 794, 797-98 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (individuals liable when shareholder set up scam involving a foreclosure-sale transaction in which the shareholder sold
the bankrupt company's assets to a viable company).

